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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
INTERMOUNTAIN SPORTS, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendants/ Appel lees. 
Case No. 20031029-CA 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
LIST OF PARTIES 
Appellant-Plaintiff is Intermountain Sports, Inc. (Intermountain). Intermountain 
was a Utah Corporation, however the corporate status became delinquent January 5, 
2004 and the corporate status expired May 6, 2004 for failure to file a renewal. 
Appellee-Defendant is the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) a 
department of the State of Utah created by statute Utah Code Ann. § 72-1-201(2001). 
JURISDICTION 
This case was transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)(2002); the Supreme Court had jurisdiction 
over this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j)(2002), as an appeal from 
final judgment 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A, Inverse Condemnation Claim 
Does Intermountain state a protected property interest under Utah law? The 
complaint identifies as the sole basis of Intermountain's inverse condemnation claim the 
alleged "blocking and/or taking" of the plaintiffs "easement of access." (Complaint 
Tflf 31-37. Addendum exhibit 1, R. 7-9.) Under Utah law, private citizens cannot own 
an "easement of access" to public right of ways. Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed 
Intermountain's inverse condemnation claim against UDOT. (R. 290, 314 at 35.) 
Standard of Review: 
The dismissal of the complaint under Utah R. Civ P. 12(c) is a question of law 
and is reviewed for correctness. A trial court's dismissal is only proper if the 
Complaint lacks legal sufficiency to allow a recovery. Bennett v. Jones Waldo, 2003 
UT9,U30,70P.3dl7. 
B. Uniform Operation of Laws Claim 
Does Utah law recognize a general cause of action for a constitutional violation? 
The complaint fails to state a cause of action, instead it accuses UDOT of "arbitrarily 
and capriciously providing other businesses with direct and beneficial access to 4500 
South Street and by configuring such access so as to direct traffic flow to those 
businesses, south of the Affected Property and north and west of the Affected Property, 
while at the same time refusing to offer such accommodations to Plaintiff who paid 
substantial taxes " (Complaint fflf 39 and 40. Addendum exhibit 1, R. 9,10.) 
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Thus the trial court correctly dismissed this claim as alleged in the complaint as 
inadequate to state a cause of action upon which damages can be awarded. (R. 291, 
314 at 35.) 
Standard of Review: 
The dismissal of the complaint under Utah R. Civ P. 12(c) is a question of law 
and is reviewed for correctness. A trial court's dismissal is only proper if the 
Complaint lacks legal sufficiency to allow a recovery. Bennett v. Jones Waldo, 2003 
UT9, 7 0 P J d l 7 . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Constitution of Utah 
Art I, § 22 [Private Property for public use,] Private Property shall not 
be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. 
Art I, § 24 [Uniform operation of laws, J All laws of a general nature 
shall have uniform operation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of the decision of the trial court to grant UDOTs Motion for 
Judgment on the pleadings under Utah R. Civ P. 12(c). 
The trial court found as a matter of law that the Complaint failed to state a claim 
sufficient under Utah law. ( R. 314 at 35.) 
Background of the Case 
In 1984 the Wasatch Front Regional Council began the 1-15 corridor study to 
determine the transportation needs and to plan to meet the needs of the public using 
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this important transportation link. After many years of public debate, planning studies, 
formal environmental impact studies, and budgetary deliberations by state, local, and 
federal legislative bodies and decision makers, work on the 1-15 and Salt Lake Light 
Rail Systems began in 1997. 
The 1-15 highway element of the work alone required the demolition and 
construction of over 136 bridges, 13 interchanges and 3 interstate-to-interstate highway 
interchanges. Every resident and every traveler, transient or resident, in Salt Lake 
County was affected by the construction impacts. 
Intermountain operated an RV sales business located at 4225 South 500 West in 
Murray, Utah. Its business premises are visible, but not directly accessible from 1-15. 
The Intermountain premises are accessible only from 500 West. (Complaint f 8, 
addendum exhibit 1, R. 2, and addendum exhibit 2, aerial photo map. R. 314 at 9.) The 
1-15 project performed no work on 500 West, did not block or disrupt traffic on 500 
West and never blocked access to Intermountain premises. (R. 314 at 10.) 
Plaintiff claimed it lost the prospect of anticipated merchandise sales during the 
1-15 project and filed suit asserting six causes of action. (Complaint, addendum 
exhibit 1, R. L) On UDOT's Motion to Dismiss (R. 62, 112) all six causes of action 
were dismissed by the trial court as failing to state a legally sufficient claim under Utah 
law. (R. 285) Intermountain now appeals only the dismissal of counts one , Inverse 
Condemnation, and two, Uniform Application of the Law. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A complaint must state a claim for relief If it does not, the Court may, on 
proper motion under Utah R. Civ P. 12(c), dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted." Intermountain's Complaint fails to assert a legally 
adequate claim. 
Intermountain's Complaint based its inverse condemnation cause of action on 
the assertion that it and its customers hold an "easement of access" over 1-15, its off-
ramps, and 4500 South to get to 500 West and thereby travel to plaintiffs premises to 
conduct business. (Complaint ^j 30-37, Addendum exhibit 1, R. 7-9.) Utah law 
recognizes no such "easement of access" and therefore the trial court was correct to 
dismiss the cause of action. 
Intermountain's complaint alleges UDOT violated article I, § 24 of Utah's 
Constitution1 by providing "other businesses with direct and beneficial access to 4500 
South Street" and "configuring such access so as to direct traffic flow to those 
businesses." (Complaint ^ 38-40, Addendum exhibit 1, R. 9, 10.) In stating its 
complaint thus, Intermountain fails to state a legal cause of action. Other than a 
taking, Utah does not recognize a stand alone cause of action for a constitutional 
violation. 
Even if there were such a direct constitutional cause of action, plaintiff has not 
1
 Art I, § 24 [Uniform operation of laws.] All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation. 
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demonstrated that, the required elements of the Spackman test have been met as a 
prerequisite to any recovery of damages for a constitutional violation. Spackman v. 
Bd. of Educ. of the Box Elder Sch. DisU 2000 UT 87, 16 P.3d 533. 
The Complaint does not state a cause of action for a constitutional cause of 
action for the denial of the uniform application of laws. Plaintiff now points to the 
Transportation Code, Title 72, of the Utah Code, as a basis for a cause of action, (Br. 
of App. At 8, 27) however, Title 72 creates no private cause of action and no such 
cause of action was pleaded in the complaint. 
The State and UDOT takes its responsibilities to private property owners very 
seriously. UDOT is responsible to both the legislature and certainly to the courts for 
its actions. States Counsel was correctly quoted in Intermountain's brief, to argue to 
the trial court, that UDOT knew this project would "break some eggs" but the brief 
fails to include that it was also argued that "UDOT has never been shy about buying 
those eggs that it is responsible for breaking." The purpose of the vast body of Utah 
law is to instruct UDOT on what eggs it must buy. Intermountain now wants this 
Court to take a quantum leap into the legislative arena to greatly increase those eggs. 
As Justice Holmes observed in the leading case Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158, (1922): 
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to 
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change 
in the general law. 
Id at 413. 
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Holmes went on to caution that in establishing where the limits fall: 
The greatest weight is given to the judgment of the legislature but it is 
always open to interested parties to contend that the legislature has gone 
beyond its constitutional power. 
Id at 413. 
The legislature must be able to establish budgets for state projects. UDOT must 
be able to reasonably plan the costs of its projects. Predictability of what eggs it must 
buy is important In doing so, it must be able to rely of the years of decisions of Utah 
courts to calculate and follow the law in determining which eggs it buys and which it 
does not. Intermountain, on the other hand, asks this court to greatly expand the 
properties UDOT must buy. In doing so, however, Intermountain fails to answer some 
important questions regarding this expansion of the law. How close must a business be 
to be paid under Plaintiffs theory? Should the State pay such impact awards to 
businesses within a quarter mile radius of an interchange? Should the circle be a half 
mile, one mile, five miles, ten miles? Should the State give an inconvenience payment 
to all citizens in the Wasatch Front? How much? Intermountain is asking two million 
dollars. Any such payments may violate the constraints on spending of highway funds 
of article XIII, § 5(6) of the Utah Constitution.2 Intermountain's premises have never 
had direct access to 4500 South Street (Complaint f^ 8, addendum exhibit, R. 2, and 
addendum exhibit 2, aerial photo map, R. 9) and the 1-15 project never interfered with 
2
 Restricts fuel tax spending to highway purposes including right of way taken or 
damaged. 
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the access traveling on 500 West from the Intermountain premises to 4500 South. (R. 
9-10.) The body of Utah law is clear - if the state takes or damages a protected 
property right for a public purpose, it must pay. Intermountain asks for more. In 1904 
the Utah Court, in addressing a railroad construction project stated: 
We do not wish to be understood as holding that every inconvenience 
that an individual may be subjected to in the possession and enjoyment of 
his property because of the construction and operation of a railroad or 
other public utility in the vicinity of his premises entitles him to damages 
or injunctive relief. The rule is will settled that no recovery can be had 
for losses and inconveniences which are suffered in common with the 
general public.. 
Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western Railway. 77 P. 849, (Utah 1904), at 852 
ARGUMENT 
Inverse Condemnation 
To prove a taking under Utah law a plaintiff must establish two elements: 
1. The claimant must demonstrate some protectable interest in 
property. 
2. The claimant must then show that the interest has been taken or 
damaged by government action. 
See Strawberry Electric Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 877, (Utah 
1996), and View Condominium v. MSICXX 2004 UT App 1041 35. 
Intermountain's inverse condemnation is based, according to its complaint, on 
its claim that it and its potential customers hold an "easement of access." Inter-
mountain claims that UDOT blocked or interfered with that "easement of access by 
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closing the 4500 South on and off ramps from 1-15 for demolition and reconstruction. 
(Complaint ffl[ 32, 33, and 34, Addendum exhibit 1, R. 7-9.) 
No "easement of access" as alleged in Intermountain's complaint is recognized 
by Utah law. An easement is a property interest. Individuals do not hold a property 
interest in public lands. The easement assumed by Intermountain must be based on a 
prescriptive right of easement for access. This can be based either on an easement of 
necessity or on a pattern of adverse use. Both are well recognized property rights, but 
neither are applicable to these facts. No easement of necessity has been plead or is 
proper because Intermountain is not "landlocked" and has full access to its land via 
public and private rights of way. Further, no prescriptive easement based on historic 
use is appropriate under these facts. It is a widely recognized principle of law that one 
cannot take an adverse possessory interest against a governmental entity. Sweeten v. 
United States. 684 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1982). This principle has been statutorily 
incorporated into the Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-13. One cannot obtain an interest in a 
public way by adverse possession. This doctrine is also confirmed and applied to 
claims of prescriptive easements in Lund v. Wilcox, 97 P. 33 (Utah 1908), and Cassity 
v. Castago. 347 P.2d 834 (Utah 1959). In citing Lund, the Cassity court stated: 
Proof that the land was owned by the government at any time during the 
prescriptive period is usually a sufficient defense to a claim of right by adverse 
use. One may not adverse the sovereign. 
347 P.2d at 834. 
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Utah has long recognized that a change of traffic patterns is not a compensable 
property interest. This principle was opined by the Utah Supreme Court as far back as 
1941 in the early days of modern highways. In the case of State Road Commission v. 
Rozzelle. 101 Utah 464, 120 P.2d 276 (Utah 1941), Justices Wolfe and McDonough in 
separate concurring opinions each stated respectively: "The law does not give 
[Defendant] a vested right in the business which travel along a public highway may 
have afforded them" and "diminution in value of the realty caused by the loss of the 
flow of traffic to or past defendant's place of business is not compensable." Id at 277. 
In 1968 the Utah Supreme Court again picked up this theme in the case of 
Hampton v. State Road Comm'n, 445 P.2d 708 (Utah 1968), where the court, in 
holding that the State has police power to place reasonable restrictions on access points 
went on to state: 
Nor does the right of ingress or egress to or from one's property include 
any right in and to existing public traffic on the highway, or any right to 
have such traffic pass by one's abutting property. The reason is that all 
traffic on public highways is controlled by the police power of the State, 
and what the police power may give an abutting property owner in the 
way of traffic on .the highway it may take away, and by any such 
diversion of traffic the State and any of its agencies are not liable for any 
decrease of property values by reason of such diversion of traffic.... 
Id. at 771. Emphasis added. 
Utah also recognizes an access right referred to as an "easement appurtenant." 
In 1974 the Utah Supreme Court issued its leading opinion on appurtenant rights in 
Utah State Road Comm'n v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974). In holding that 
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the rights of access, light, and air are easements appurtenant to the land 
of an abutting owner or a street; that constitute property rights forming 
part of the owner's estate. These substantial property rights, although 
subject to reasonable regulation, may not be taken away or impaired 
without just compensation. 
Id at 928, 929. 
The Miya court was equally clear in proclaiming the principle that: 
A property owner has no property right to a free and unrestricted flow of 
traffic past his premises, and any impairment or interference with this 
flow does not entitle the owner to compensation. 
Id at 928. 
As recently as November 2002 the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the principle 
that the protected appurtenant access right does not create an unlimited claim to access 
and traffic movements in Utah Department of Transportation v. Harvey Real Estate, 
2002 Ut 107 atf 14, 57 P,3d. 1088 : 
This right doesn't include the right to travel in any particular direction 
from one's property or upon any particular part of the public highway 
right of way. Nor does the right of ingress or egress to or from one's 
property include any right in and to existing public traffic on the 
highway, or any right to have such traffic pass by one's abutting 
property. Quotations omitted. 
UDOT v. Harvev 2002 UT 107, % 15, 57 P.3d. 1088. 
Intermountain does not enjoy an easement appurtenant because its access point 
is not to either 1-15 or to 4500 South. Intermountain's easement appurtenant is to 500 
West. (Complaint J^ 8, addendum exhibit 1, R. 2, and addendum exhibit 2, aerial photo 
map. R. 314 at 9.) 
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It is clear from Utah law that Intermountain and its potential customers did not 
have an "easement of access" either by necessity, prescription, or rights appurtenant, 
and because its inverse condemnation claim is based on an "easement of access," the 
trial court was correct in dismissing the inverse condemnation cause of action. 
The brief filed herein by Intermountain's counsel instead of defending its 
pleaded cause of action, presents a dissertation on the history of inverse condemnation 
law in Utah, and raises many new arguments and academic theories regarding inverse 
condemnation which were not advanced in the complaint. Intermountain's counsel 
blurs the lines between an inverse taking and a regulatory taking. Appellant's brief 
now argues that its protected right is a right to conduct business and enter into 
contracts. UDOT's brief will not address the historical discourse but does wish to 
address the current state of the law in Utah in inverse condemnation and government 
takings both possessory and regulatory. 
This Court in View Condominium v. MSICCX 2004 UT App 104, has 
reaffirmed the principles stated in Strawberry Electric Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 
918 P.2d 870, (Utah 1996), that the claimant must demonstrate some recognized 
constitutionally protected property interest. 
Does Intermountain present a interest in property for the courts to protect with 
constitutional fervor? No. The property interest now asserted by Intermountain is the 
bare hope that drivers driving southbound on 1-15 will see their show yard located on 
the west side of 1-15, and on a sudden impulse will exit 1-15 at 4500 South and drive 
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approximately 1 mile in a circular route to purchase a new motor home or travel trailer. 
This wishful thinking of future sales falls far short of the types of contractual property 
rights which the Court has described as protected in Strawberry Electric and in 
Bagford v. Ephriam City. 904 P.2d 1095, (Utah 1995). Bagford stated that "to create a 
protectable property interest, a contact must establish rights more substantial in nature 
than a mere unilateral expectation of continued rights or benefits." Id. at 1099. 
Referring to contracts as a property right the court stated: 
A contact that is terminable at the will of either party does not by itself 
give rise to protectable property interest because the mere expectation of 
benefits under such a contract does not give the promisor a legally 
enforceable right against a promisee to provide future service and 
therefore does not by itself provide a basis for compensation for loss of 
future business. 
Id at 1099. 
Intermountain does not present an enforceable contract right, merely the hope of 
future sales. A protected property right must demonstrate a more certain legal right 
than wishful business hopes of potential sales. 
Even if Intermountain were able to present a protected property right, the 
second element of this test must still be established - was the interest taken or damaged 
by government action? Intermountain was open for business throughout the project 
time period using its normal and only access to its premises off of 500 West. Traffic 
on 500 West was not halted, blocked, or otherwise interfered with by the project. 
(Complaint, addendum exhibit 1, R. 1, R. 314 at 9, 27.) The construction of the 1-15 
13 
project did not constitute a taking of Intermountain's protected property rights under 
Utah law. 
Intermountain now, in the alternative, also attempts to recharacterize the 
property interest taken by UDOT as Intermountain's "right to use its land for the 
operation of a commercial business." (Brief pp. 8, 11-15.) This argument was not 
presented by Intermountain in its complaint and thus is not properly before the court. 
In any event, this Court has addressed a similar argument in its recent decision in 
Diamond B-Y Ranches v. Tooele County, 2004 UT App. 135. In B-Y Ranches, this 
Court opined that a taking occurs if: 
[a] regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of 
land, or even if the property has not necessarily been deprived of all 
economically beneficial use; an analysis of several factors indicates that 
the interference is so great that a virtual taking has nonetheless occurred. 
Quotations omitted. 
Id at 114. 
The B-Y Ranches court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the claim and 
remanded the case for a factual finding to determine "if the effect of denying the 
permit is to leave its property economically idle... ."Id. atf 18. 
Although the complaint does not present these arguments and Intermountain 
raises them first in its brief, the allegation must fail on its face because unlike the 
situation in B-Y Ranches, as the Complaint indicates, the land was not left idle but was 
used for commercial business operations throughout the 1-15 project and is still so used 
to date. (R. 314 at 27). 
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Finally, Intermountain argues that a jury should be allowed to determine what is 
a compensable claim for a taking under Utah law. (Br. Of App. at 8, 11.) Juries 
determine questions of fact. Utah Code Ann §78-21-2 (2002). These are questions of 
law to be determined by the court. Utah Code Ann § 78-21-3(2002). 
Uniform Operation of Laws 
The complaint identifies as the basis of Intermountain's denial of uniform 
operation of laws claim the alleged "arbitrarily and capriciously providing other 
businesses with direct and beneficial access to 4500 South Street and by configuring 
such access so as to direct traffic flow to those businesses, south of the Affected 
Property and north and west of the Affected Property, while at the same time refusing 
to offer such accommodations to Plaintiff who paid substantial taxes. . . ." (Complaint 
t f 39 and 40. Addendum exhibit 1, R. 9,10.) 
First, art 1, § 24 is not a self enforcing clause of the Utah Constitution under 
Spackman. Second, these allegations fail to state a cause of action upon which 
damages can be awarded. A claim for violation of a state constitutional right requires 
either a statutory or common law cause of action such as a negligence claim. In 
probing the sufficiency of a claim for damages resulting from an alleged constitutional 
violation, the Utah Supreme Court has held: 
We begin by identifying the source of our authority to award damages for 
constitutional violations. Except for the Takings Clause, the Utah 
Constitution does not expressly provide damage remedies for 
constitutional violations. Thus, aside from the Takings Clause, there is 
no textual constitutional right to damages for one who suffers a 
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constitutional tort . . . . In the absence of applicable constitutional or 
statutory authority, Utah courts employ the common law. . . . Hence, a 
Utah court's ability to award damages for violation of a self-executing 
constitutional provision rests on the common law. 
Spackman v. Bd. of Educ. of the Box Elder Sch. DisU 2000 UT 87, % 20, 16 P.3d 533 
(2000). 
Intermountain's complaint fails to state a legal basis for its cause of action and 
was properly dismissed by the trial court on the Utah R. Civ P. 12(c) motion to dismiss. 
Intermountain now argues to this Court that the Transportation Code, Title 72 of 
the Utah Code, gives Intermountain a cause of action. (Brief pp. 9, 27.) Intermountain 
is unable to point to an express creation of a private cause of action in Title 72 because 
none exists. Under Utah law, it is improper to read a private cause of action into a 
statute if it is not expressly stated. 
In the absence of language expressly granting a private right of action in 
the statute itself, the courts of this state are reluctant to imply a private 
right of action based on state law. 
Miller v. Weaver. 2003 UT 12, 66 P.3d 592 (2003) ^ 20. 
Intermountain's complaint was properly dismissed because it fails to properly 
allege a cause of action upon which damages can be awarded under Utah law. 
Even had the complaint properly stated a compensable cause of action under 
Utah law, it fails to allege the three required elements to proceed with a private suit for 
damages under a constitutional provision as announced by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Spackman v. Board of Ed. of Box Elder. 2000 UT 87, 6 P.3d 533 (2000). 
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The Spackman court announced: 
to ensure that damage actions [for constitutional violations] are permitted 
only under appropriate circumstances, we therefore hold that a plaintiff 
must establish the following three elements before he or she may proceed 
with a private suit for damages. 
First, plaintiff must establish that he or she suffered a "flagrant" 
violation of his or her constitutional rights. . . . 
Second, a plaintiff must establish that existing remedies do not 
redress his or her injuries.... 
Third, a plaintiff must establish that equitable relief, such as an 
injunction, was and is wholly in adequate to protect the plaintiffs rights 
or redress his or her injuries.... Id. at J^ 20. 
Intermountain's complaint fails to allege how these three required elements 
have been established. The complaint was therefore properly dismissed. 
Intermountain leaps over these steps and even in its brief still fails to establish a basis 
for a court entertaining its claim. 
Intermountain's complaint fails to state a recognized cause of action for a 
violation of art. I § 24 of the Utah constitution and the additional arguments now 
presented in its brief also fall far short of justifying allowing the case to proceed. 
CONCLUSION 
A claim for a government taking whether a regulatory taking or an inverse 
condemnation, must assert a protected property right under Utah law. Intermountain 
fails to do so under Coleman v Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990), 
under Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores v. Salt Lake City. 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989), 
under Strawberry. 918 P.2d 870, (Utah 1996), under Bagford, 904 P.2d 1095, (Utah 
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1995), or under Diamond B-Y Ranches, 2004 UT App. 135. Intermountain is asking 
this Court to create new law by creating a new cause of action. 
Intermountain fails to state a proper cause of action for a violation of the 
uniform application of laws constitutional provision. The trial Court was correct to 
grant the Utah R. Civ P. 12(c) Motion to dismiss because the complaint was deficient. 
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed. 
DEFENDANT STATE OF UTAH DOES NOT REQUEST 
ORAL ARGUMENT OR A PUBLISHED OPINION 
Defendant-Appellee State of Utah does not request oral argument and a 
published opinion in this matter. The questions raised in this appeal, having already 
been decided by the courts in published opinions, are not such that oral argument or a 
published opinion are necessary. If argument is held by the Court, the defendant 
desires to participate. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this of June, 2004. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant State of Utah, 
Utah Department of Transportation 
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EXHIBIT 1 
RECEIVED 
JUN " 6 2002 
UT. DEPT. OF TRANSP. 
Steven C. Tycksen (#3Wffi»^MQMT. UNIT 
B. Ray Zoll (#3607) 
ZOLL & TYCKSEN, LC. 
5300 South 360 West, Suite 360 
Murray, Utah 84123 
Telephone: (801) 685-7800 
Facsimile: (801) 685-7808 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, SANDY DEPARTMENT 
Intermountain Sports, Inc. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION AND 
MURRAY CITY, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Intermountain Sports, Inc. 
("Intermountain"), by and through its attorneys, Zoll & Tycksen, and 
complains against the Defendants as follows: 
JURISDICTION, VENUE AND PARTIES 
1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1). 
3A
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COMPLAINT 
(JURY DEMAND) 
Case No. 
H o n o r a b l e / ^ ! na \\IAG, 
Venue of this claim is properly in this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-13-1, in that the cause of action arose in Salt 
.Lake County, and the property at issue is located in Salt Lake 
County. 
Plaintiff Intermountain is a business operating in Murray, Utah as 
a recreational vehicle sales company. 
Defendant Murray City (the "City") is a municipal corporation 
organized pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah. 
Defendant Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") is an 
agency or instrumentality of the State of Utah. 
Intermountain has a right to sue the defendants pursuant to 
Article I, Sections 22 and 24 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 63-30-10.5 and 63-30-10, and other legal and equitable 
remedies. 
The claims alleged in this complaint arise in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
John Ashby ("Ashby") is the owner and operator of 
Intermountain located at 4225 South 500 West, Murray, Utah, 
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on the west frontage road at 1-15 and north of 4500 South 
Street ("the Affected Property"). 
9. Intermountain has had a longstanding easement of access on the 
Affected Property, giving it access to the 1-15 southbound off-
ramp to 4500 South and to 4500 South Street. The Affected 
Property is shown on the map attached hereto as Exhibit A and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
10. On July 14, 1997, Intermountain received a letter and flyer from 
Carol Provenzano with Wasatch Constructors giving open house 
meeting information and the beginning date, on or about August 
6, 1997, of the 1-15 Reconstruction Project. See Letter attached 
as Exhibit B. 
11. Upon information and belief, the open house meetings served 
only for information and instruction, not for hearing and meeting 
the needs of local businesses. 
12. Prior to construction, Ashby performed extensive due diligence to 
determine whether or not there would be little effect to his 
business from the Reconstruction Project. 
13. While serving as President of the 1-15 Coalition, a non-profit 
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group of business owners representing over 850 businesses 
along the freeway corridor, Ashby testified at a meeting 
.addressing the Reconstruction Project at the request of Senator 
Howell. 
14. Ashby, acting for Intermountain Sports RV and the 1-15 
Coalition, contacted UDOT with respect to their plan for the 4500 
South interchange. In response to his query, he was provided a 
copy of a letter and drawing. These-show a full closure of the 
Affected Property at the 4500 South interchange for a period of 
one year at the most. 
15. UDOT represented to Intermountain that the Affected Property 
would be closed for one year. 
16. UDOT officials met with business owners, including Ashby, and 
represented to said business owners that their concerns would 
be taken into consideration, but no action was taken nor 
remuneration made for the anticipated taking of Intermountain's 
property rights. 
17. In direct reliance on the statements, representations and 
drawings of the City and UDOT, Intermountain did not pursue 
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action against UDOT or the City and has only now been able to 
determine its ascertainable damages, making its claims ripe for 
adjudication. 
18. After reconstruction of 1-15 began, traffic flow on 1-15, in the 
area of 4500 South Street, dropped two thirds from the traffic 
flow figures prior to the Reconstruction Project. 
19. In July 1997, UDOT began reconstruction on 1-15 effecting 4500 
South Street, by closing the off-rarrvp to the Affected Property. 
See Exhibit A. 
20. Access to the Affected Property was closed until December 1998, 
a period of 18 months instead of the 12 months promised by 
UDOT in its construction contract. 
21. The City and UDOT placed periodic closures on traffic at the 4500 
South Street off-ramp over the following 2 Vi years. 
22. The State and City were effectively closing access to freeway 
exits and entrances, as well as access for East and West traffic at 
the 4500 South Street off-ramp, from July 1997 until May 2001, 
nearly a period of four years. 
23. The access provided by Defendants, in lieu of direct access off 
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the 4500 South off-ramp, involved a circuitous 2.5-mile loop (the 
"Circuitous Loop") (Attached as Exhibit "C") behind the Affected 
Property, which frustrated and eliminated potential customers. 
The Circuitous Loop was impractical and unreasonable for 
purposes of bringing prospective customers from the freeway to 
Plaintiff's business. Not only was the critical line of sight lost, 
but also the route was lengthy and confusing. 
24. Upon information and belief, the already significantly diminished 
number of potential customers from drive-by traffic, now 1/3 of 
what it was prior to re-construction, ended up getting lost and 
never arriving to Intermountain. 
25. The closure of the off-ramp, coupled with the change in 
configuration, denied reasonable access to the Affected Property 
and substantially damaged the value of Plaintiff's property in an 
amount to be proven at trial but currently calculated to be in 
excess of $2,000,000.00. 
26. The City constructed the Circuitous Loop in such a manner that 
other businesses obtained direct access to 4500 South off-ramp 
traffic, who otherwise benefited from the loss to Intermountain. 
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27. Such action by the Defendants became tantamount to a taking of 
the property for the good of others and at the expense of 
Intermountain without just compensation. 
28. In the alternative, the City and/or UDOT, their agents, and 
employees who planned directed the traffic flow surrounding the 
Affected Property failed to exercise reasonable care, which 
directly resulted in the loss of business incurred by 
Intermountain. 
29. Further, UDOT, its employees, and agents failed to exercise 
reasonable care in the planning and execution of the 
reconstruction of 1-15 and the 4500 South Street interchange, 
which directly resulted in the loss of business incurred by 
Intermountain. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(INVERSE CONDEMNATION - UDOT & MURRAY CITY) 
30. Plaintiff re-alleges each of the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 29 of the Complaint as if fully set forth 
herein. 
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31. In violation of § 63-30-10.5 of the Utah Code and Article I 
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, Defendants took or impaired 
Plaintiff's substantial property right for a public use without just 
compensation. 
32. Upon information and belief, Defendants' determination to block 
and/or take the Plaintiff's easement of access over the Affected 
Property, allowing access to the 1-15 Southbound off-ramp at 
4500 South and to 4500 South Street was based on a public 
purpose to expand 1-15 to reduce traffic impediments and safety 
concerns along 1-15, as well as enhancing the 4500 South off-
ramp. 
33. In closing the off-ramp and otherwise blocking and/or taking the 
Plaintiff's easement of access, Defendants substantially and 
materially impaired Plaintiff's right of access to the 1-15 off-ramp 
at 4500 South and to 4500 South Street as well as Plaintiff's 
customers' right of access to 4500 South Street and the Affected 
Property. 
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34. In blocking and/or taking the Plaintiff's easement of access over 
the Affected Property, Defendants substantially diminished the 
value of Plaintiff's private property. 
35. This injury to Intermountain was an unavoidable result of the 
City and UDOT's action and was continuous for a period of 
almost four years. 
36. Defendants' shutting down, blocking, and/or taking the Plaintiff's 
easement of access to the 1-15 Southbound off-ramp at 4500 
South and to 4500 South Street was damaging to Plaintiff's 
private property interest for a public use without just 
compensation. 
37. Plaintiff is entitled to actual, economic, special and compensatory 
damages to be proven at trial and believed to be at least 
$2,000,000.00. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(DENIAL OF UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS -
UDOT & MURRAY CITY) 
38. Plaintiff re-alleges each of the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 37 of the Complaint as if fully set forth 
herein. 
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39. The City and UDOT have discriminated against Plaintiff in 
violation of Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution, by, among 
other things, arbitrarily and capriciously providing other 
businesses with direct and beneficial access to 4500 South Street 
and by configuring such access so as to direct traffic flow to 
those businesses, south of the Affected Property and north and 
west of the Affected Property, while at the same time refusing to 
offer such accommodations to Plaintiff who paid substantial taxes 
to the City and State and who relied on the City and UDOT's 
representations. 
40. The City's and UDOT's accommodation of other businesses and 
the diversion of traffic through State and Municipal regulations 
from the Affected Property towards those other businesses was 
unreasonable and was not for a legitimate legislative purpose. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH 
AND FAIR DEALING - UDOT & MURRAY CITY) 
41. Plaintiff re-alleges each of the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 40 of the Complaint as if fully set forth 
herein. 
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42. Defendant City and UDOT in determining to block and/or take 
Plaintiff's substantial property interest in the Affected Property, 
denying reasonable access to 1-15, and thereby stifling the 
commercial development in the area effectively destroyed or 
injured Intermountain's rights to receive its justified 
expectations. 
43. Plaintiff Intermountain has been seriously injured as a result of 
the City and UDOT's conduct in an amount to be proven at trial 
but currently calculated to be in excess of $2,000,000.00. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(NEGLIGENCE - UDOT & MURRAY CITY) 
44. Plaintiff re-alleges each of the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 43 above as if fully set forth herein. 
45. Plaintiff alleges that in the planning and execution of the traffic 
flow surrounding the Affected Property the City and/or UDOT, 
their employees, and agents failed to exercise reasonable care 
when creating the circuitous route. 
46. Plaintiff further alleges that UDOT, its employees, and agents 
failed to exercise reasonable care in the planning, design, and 
11 
execution of the reconstruction of 1-15 and the 4500 South 
interchange. 
47. Upon information and belief, the Defendants negligently 
interfered with the contractual relationships and potential 
relationships Intermountain had with vendors and customers, by 
(1) causing vendors to discontinue doing business with 
Intermountain, (2) making it impossible for Intermountain to 
satisfy customers, and (3) jeopardizing the value of 
Intermountain's business. 
48. The Defendants have negligently and proximately, caused 
damages to Intermountain. Intermountain is entitled to 
damages in an amount to be proven at trial for the Defendants' 
interference. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC RELATIONS -
UDOT AND MURRAY CITY) 
49. Plaintiff re-alleges each of the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 48 above as if fully set forth herein. 
50. Upon information and belief, the Defendants intentionally 
interfered with the economic relationship Intermountain had with 
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its potential buyers, the buyers choosing to not come by the 
property and to not do any further business with Intermountain. 
51. .Upon information and belief, the Defendants' interference was 
for an improper purpose, which was to have Intermountain's 
customers and vendors avoid the property voluntarily and 
discontinue or avoid any business relationship with 
Intermountain. 
52. Upon information and belief, the Defendants' interference was by 
an improper means, as Defendants, contrary to law, requested 
that Intermountain and other businesses not bring claims against 
them and did not conduct condemnation hearings. 
53. The Defendants' interference was the proximate and immediate 
cause of Intermountain's economic injuries. Intermountain is 
entitled to damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(BREACH OF CONTRACT - UDOT) 
54. Plaintiff re-alleges each of the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 53 above as if fully set forth herein. 
55. Defendant UDOT made representations to Intermountain that 
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the closed access to 1-15 at 4500 South would last one year. 
56. UDOT made representations to Intermountain that it would 
address the concerns of the local businesses along 1-15, 
including those of Intermountain. 
57. Intermountain relied upon those representations and did not 
bring an action during the reconstruction of 1-15. 
58. Such forbearance, based on UDOT's representations and 
promises to address the needs of business owners, constituted 
consideration for that promise. 
59. Defendant UDOT breached this contract by never addressing the 
business' concerns, including those of Intermountain. 
60. UDOT further breached this contract by closing access to 1-15 at 
4500 South for a period of nearly four years, and not one year 
as represented to Intermountain by Defendant UDOT. 
61 . Plaintiff Intermountain has been seriously injured as a result of 
the Defendant's conduct in an amount to be proven at trial but 
currently calculated to be in excess of $2,000,000.00. 
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
NOW THEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against the 
Defendants as follows: 
1. On its First Cause of Action, Intermountain requests that this 
Court award it damages in an amount to be proven at trial but 
calculated to be at least $2,000,000.00. 
2. On its Second Cause of Action, Intermountain requests that this 
Court award it damages in an amoupt to be proven at trial but 
currently calculated to be in excess of $2,000,000.00. 
3. On its Third Cause of Action, Intermountain requests that this 
Court award it damages in an amount to be proven at trial but 
currently calculated to be in excess of $2,000,000.00. 
4. On its Fourth Cause of Action, Intermountain requests that this 
Court award it damages for the City and State's negligent 
interference with the contractual relationships Intermountain had 
and still has with its vendors as well the lost potential 
relationships with future customers and vendors in an amount to 
be proven at trial and calculated at $2,000,000.00. 
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5. On its Fifth Cause of Action, Intermountain requests that this 
Court award it damages for the Defendants' negligent and 
intentional interference with the prospective economic 
relationships Plaintiff had and still has with its buyers, in an 
amount to be proven at trial and calculated at $2,000,000.00. 
6. On its Sixth Cause of Action, Intermountain requests that this 
Court award it damages in an amount to be proven at trial but 
currently calculated to be in excess of $2,000,000.00. 
7. For costs and attorney fees as allowed by law. 
8. For such other and further legal and equitable relief as the court 
may find just and proper. 
DATED and SIGNED this ^ day of May 2002. 
ZOLL & TYCKSEN, L.C. 
B. Ray Zoll</ ^ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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EXHIBIT A 
Closed Ramps: 
145 southbound off-ramp to 4500 
South 
Alternate Routes for 4500 South 
• Exit at 3300 South and takr Stats SITCZI or Redwood Road 
• Exit at 5300 South and talc- *>t*t? Sr—t nr *^~~~i r>~~* 
EXHIBIT B 
INTERSTAi E 15 
Juiv 14, 1997 RECONSTRUCTION 
Dear Residezt or 3usmcss Owner.* 
Cn or around August 5, i e M 5 Reconstruction Project will begin to affect residents, commuters and 
businesses using i e 4;C0 S o u i interchange- Trus action is one of many i a t axike up the largest design-
build 'z:ghw/ project m i e United Sates. 
f or you, it means planning your trips to address closure of I-15 Southbound off-ramp at 4500 South and 
the 4500 South on-ram? to 1-15 Southbound. R c ^ c j q s j i r e ^ : ^ ^ 
Access to 4500 S o u i frizz M S Southbound 
• Exit at 2300 South and take State Street or Redwood Road 
• Exl: at 5300 South and take State Scree: or Redwood Read 
Access to Points South rom 4500 South 
• Take Sate Street to 53CC South on-ramp to 1-15 Southbound 
• Take 4500 S o u i to 1-215 
An alternate for all Nbri/South travel is 1-215. This roadway has been expanded to four lanes in each 
direction. The additional capacity and easy access to east/west surface streets makes this a good alternate 
to include in your trip planning- During 4500 South ramp closures, southbound ramps will remain open at 
32QQ S o u i and 53CQ South- Rainps at 4500 S o u i will re-open in approximately 12 months. 
Drivers can expect quicker and easier access to and rom 1-15 when reconstruction is complete. Until 
construchon is complete, staying informed is your key to getting through i e 1-15 reconstruction w i i as 
little impact as pessfole to your schedule and your lifestyle. Call i e informatian line at 3SS-uN70-115. 
Access i e Web site at w-vw.M5.com. Find and use traffic reports in i e local media. Consider changing 
your travel panerns by combining trips or talking w i i your employer about flex-time scheduling. Think 
about ridizg a bike, taking i e bus to work or eliminating some zips altogcier by telecommuting - you'll 
be reducing raffle (and ycur stress level!). 
Included w i i ±is letter, is a flyer addressing issues specific to i e 450Q S o u i areas. Fiyer information 
includes ac announcement for harness and community open house meetings. These meetings are an 
opportunity to obtain mere infemnation on planned closures, alternate routes, and project process and 
schedule - wz hope you will come. 
Thank you :n ld^izze for ycur active pirzcipizicr.. 
Cml Pro venzano /) 
Business and Community AfzxJz 
Program Manager 
Wasatch Constructors 
INTERSTATE 15 
R O A D TO T H E F U T U R 
July. I 
4500 South Interchange Ramp Closur 
>use 
The rzzons^czcr* of +5C0 Scudi interchange 
means quicker, easier access :c and from 1-15. 
Ln addmon to rebuilding bridge footings, the 
bndges themselves and expanding the decks, 
chis intersection will be rebuilt with an 
improved interchange. The new Single Point 
L'rban Interchange (5?U0 system will make 
traffic flow mere effective and efficient. 
SEEING IS BELIEVING 
Reconstruction aenvmes will bring with them 
barriers blodcng closed ramps, detour signs 
and seme increased truck traffic Working 
with construction impacts may be difficult ac 
first, but driver planning and regular use of 
alternate routes will make your uizs easier 
CLOSURE SCHEDULE 
August 6: 
I-I5 ScuAbound off-ramp to 45C0 South. 
August 6: 
45CQ Sou£i on-namp to [-15 Southbound. 
East to w-est travel on 4500 South will remain 
open d'J-^g ramp closures Infrequent 
CCSUTZS may be necessary during hf.dgt 
removal activities - tht community, affected 
businesses and scrnzts will be notified. The 
northbound on-and c:7-ramps will remain 
open during this approximately one-year 
closure. 
ALTERNATE ROUTES 
Aczzss to 4500 Scum from 1-15 Southbound 
• Exit at 3300 South and cake State Street or 
Redwood Road 
• Exit at 53G0 South and take SOLZC 
Access co Points South from 45C0 South 
• Take Sca:e Scree: to 53CC South on-ramp 
• lake 45CG South to 1-215 
An alternate for all North/South travel is I-
215. This roadway has been expanded to feu: 
lanes in each direction. The additional 
capacity and essy access to east/west surface 
streets makes this a *coc alternate to include 
in your tnp planning. Dunng 4500 South 
ramp closures, southbound-otT ramps will 
remaLn open at 3300 South and 5300 South. 
OPEN HOUSE MEETINGS 
Wisatch Constructors will host a series of 
Open House meetings focusing on upcoming * 
ram? closures at 3300 and ^500 South. The 
meetings will gr-'e ^siderrs and businesses a 
chance to 
• Learn about planned closures 
• View plans for &.c reconstructed 
interchange 
• Discuss communications plans 
•
 Review alternate route "options 
cz~vr~cd on beck... 
I - l j Reconstruction i 
45C North 2200 West 
5a!: Lake Or/, b'T 8*116 
jm 
Information: Where to get it 
OPEN HOUSE MEETINGS: 
Business Open H o u s e s 
Monday, July 23 
12:00-1:30 p.m. 
Quality Inn 
4465 Century Dc (450 W) 
Murray 
Wednesday. July 30 
I2:C0-1:30 p.m. 
Quality Inn 
4^55 Cencir/ Dr (450 W3 
Murray 
C o m m u n i t y Open H o u s e s 
Tuesday. July 29 
6 p m. - 8 p m. 
Wccdrow Wiiscn Elementary 
2325 Sou* 200 Eisz 
South Sale Lake 
Thu3day July 31 
6 p m. - 8 p m. 
Sal: Lake Lutheran School ~ 
4020 South 900 Ease 
Sal: Lake Cicy 
"PLAN ON I T " - STAY INFORMED 
Until construction is complete, staying 
informed is your key co getting through the 
M 5 reconstruction with as liccle impact as 
possible co your schedule and your Iifestyfe. 
Read the newspaper and watch/listen-for traffic 
updates on radio and TV' news. Tfcu can access 
information sources ac: 
Internet: www.M5.com 
Tbilfrec: 1-888-INFO-M5 
UDOT: 961-6000 (recorded information) 
QUESTIONS? 
V^asacch Constructors 
UDOT I-15 Team 
Construction Noise 
59^-6-CO 
231-8167 
322-237S 
For UDOT issues noc directly related co the 
M5 Reconstrucdon Project, zeetss UDOTs 
VVeo sice ac www.sr.ex.srace.ucus and select che 
Head Conditions icon, or call UDOT ac 
965-10CQ. 
yanpool m g 
Individuals can get themselves and others 
to work by vanpooling. Passengers share 
expenses of maintenance and gas according 
to distance traveled and frequency. 
EXHIBIT C 
Closed Ramps: 
• 15C0 South southbound off-amp 
' 4500 Scuch nonhbcund on and oZ-nvrlFs 
• 33C0 Scuch southbound on-rsmp 
Open Ramps: 
'M ramps ac53CO South 
-' lS?5"? ^ f ^ °n-nn,P Ce25cbcund « « s only) JJCV Scuch ncrthcound on and off-ramps 
• 3300 Souch southbound otT-ramD 
Easf/Wesi Closure; 
* 45CO South bewcn 500 West and 100 Itesc 
C4^ C0 South f e c u n d co 1-15 souchbeund re.-Tuins oct') 
A/ternafe East/West Routes-
• 39C0 South 
• 43CO Souch 
Freeway Cetours 
• 53CO Souch 
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